In the Matter of the Estate of William O. Hickok, VI, Deceased
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Surrogate's Court of New York, Orange County
140 Misc. 2d 650; 530 N.Y.S.2d 983; 1988 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 468
July 12, 1988
CORE TERMS: marital deduction, decedent, unlimited, construe,
codicil, formula, surviving spouse, family trust, transitional,
testament, Tax Reform Act, residuary estate, maximum, consisting,
disinherit, allowable, testator, squarely, Economic Recovery
Tax Act, beneficial interest, property passing, fractional
part, adjusted gross, trust created, estate tax, republished,
residuary, effective, outright, intend
HEADNOTES: [***1] Wills -- Construction -- Maximum Marital
Deduction under Formula Clause Decedent's will (dated May
13, 1966) and codicil (dated Feb. 4, 1986), which create both
a marital deduction trust consisting of a fractional part
of the residuary needed to obtain the "maximum marital deduction
allowable" in determining Federal estate tax "under the laws
in effect at the time of [decedent's] death" and a family
trust consisting of the balance of the residuary estate, should
not be construed so as to provide an unlimited marital deduction
allowed by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA; Pub
L 97-34) as to the estates of decedents dying on or after
January 1, 1982 since the transitional rule of section 403
of ERTA, applying the maximum 50%/$ 250,000 marital deduction
provided by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, is applicable to decedent's
estate in that decedent died after December 31, 1981 without
amending the will to refer specifically to an unlimited marital
deduction and no State law has been enacted which would construe
the formula clause as referring to the unlimited marital deduction.
In addition, the will should not be construed to provide an
unlimited marital deduction since decedent [***2] did not
intend to disinherit his children from any beneficial interest
in his estate. COUNSEL: Hornbug, Diggs & Marks, P. C. (Robert
M. Diggs of counsel), for petitioner. Jeffer, Hartman, Hopkinson,
Vogel, Coomber & Peiffer (Charles R. Buhrman of counsel),
for Margo M. Hickok, respondent, McCarthy Fingar, Donovan,
Drazen & Smith (John G. McQuaid of counsel), for Ann H. Meia
and others, respondents. Robin A. Bikkal for the People of
the State of New York.
JUDGES: Eugene M. Hanofee, J.
OPINIONBY: HANOFEE
OPINION: [*651] [**984]
OPINION OF THE COURT This is a proceeding brought on by the
coexecutors of the last will and testament of William O. Hickok,
VI, for construction of paragraph I of article third of the
last will and testament herein, which provides for the creation
of a marital deduction trust. By necessary implication, this
court must also construe the provisions of paragraph II of
article third of the will, whereby the decedent herein created
a family trust.
The decedent, William O. Hickok, VI, died on January 16, 1987,
domiciled in the Village of Goshen, County of Orange, and
State of New York, leaving a last will and testament dated
May 13, 1966 and a codicil thereto dated February 4, 1986.
[***3] Paragraph I of article third, as republished by such
codicil, provides for the creation of a marital deduction
trust consisting of "that fractional part of my residuary
estate which shall be needed to obtain the maximum marital
deduction allowable in determining the Federal Estate Tax
payable by my estate under the laws in effect at the time
of my death". Paragraph II of article third of this will,
as republished by the codicil, provides for the creation of
a family trust which "shall consist of the balance of my residuary
estate remaining after the payment therefrom of taxes and
duties as provided in Article sixth of this will". In this
proceeding, [**985] the respondent, Margo M. Hickok, is the
decedent's second wife, his first wife having died in 1961.
The respondents, Ann H. Meia, Janet H. Ritter, Louise H. Snyder
and William O. Hickok, VII, are decedent's children by his
first wife. The respondent, Neil M. Hickok, is the decedent's
child by his marriage to the respondent, Margo M. Hickok,
but has not appeared in this proceeding.
At the time the instant will was executed in 1966, the Internal
Revenue Code provided for deduction of up to 50% of the adjusted
gross estate for all property [***4] passing to the surviving
spouse, whether outright or by way of a trust where the income
was payable to the surviving spouse, provided he or she was
granted an unlimited power to appoint the principal upon death.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the limits of the marital
deduction to 50% or $ 250,000, whichever sum was greater.
A transitional rule applied in the Tax Reform Act of 1976
so that the new law did not apply to a will or trust created
before January 1, 1977, containing a formula expressly providing
that the spouse was to receive the maximum [*652] amount of
property qualifying for the marital deduction allowable by
Federal law. However, effective January 1, 1987, the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (Pub L 97-34; hereinafter referred
to as ERTA) increased the amount of the exemption from a Federal
estate tax by use of a credit equivalent to $ 600,000. Simultaneously
therewith, the United States Congress enacted an unlimited
marital deduction as to all property passing outright to a
surviving spouse or under certain trusts, effective as to
decedents dying on or after January 1, 1982. Section 403 of
ERTA provides a transitional rule as regards the unlimited
marital [***5] deduction.
In pertinent part, as applicable to this case, the transitional
rule of section 403 of ERTA provides that the 50%/$ 250,000
marital deduction will continue to apply if the decedent dies
after December 31, 1981 and the formula clause of said will
is not amended before the death of the decedent to refer specifically
to an unlimited marital deduction, and there is not enacted
a State law, applicable to the estate, which would construe
the formula clause as referring to the increased marital deduction
as amended by ERTA.
It is clear from a review of this will and codicil that the
circumstances thereof bring it squarely within the purview
of the transition rule of ERTA ( Matter of Stonehill, 136
Misc 2d 272 [Sur Ct, Monroe County 1987]; Reynolds v Russell,
433 A2d 699 [Del Ch, Sussex County 1981]). Therefore, as the
decedent herein did not amend his will to refer to the unlimited
marital deduction and because the State of New York has not
enacted a statute which would construe the formula clause
as referring to the unlimited marital deduction, the ERTA
provisions must apply squarely to this will, necessitating
that the 50%/$ 250,000 marital [***6] deduction limit must
apply.
This court is constrained to further comment on the language
contained in the marital deduction trust, to wit: "payable
by my estate under the laws in effect at the time of my death".
In a proceeding seeking construction of the effect of provisions
of a will, the Surrogate's Court's principal concern must
be the testator's intent ( Matter of Kosek, 31 NY2d 475 [1973];
Matter of Khadad, 135 Misc 2d 67 [Sur Ct, Nassau County 1987]).
As such, regarding construction, a will must be examined as
a whole, with particular attention to the decedent's testamentary
plan and said intent being ascertained from a reading of the
words used and the provisions of the entire will ( Matter
of Fabbri, 2 NY2d 236 [1957]; Matter of [*653] Schwartz, 92
Misc 2d 40 [Sur Ct, NY County 1977]). In the absence of ambiguous
language contained within the will, the court is restricted
to the four corners of the will, including the family circumstances
at the time of the execution thereof ( Matter of Coughlin,
171 App Div 662 [2d Dept 1916]).
This court is of the opinion that the language [***7] of the
instant will, "under the [**986] laws in effect at the time
of my death", is unambiguous. However, this court is faced
with a situation wherein there are several other concerns
indicated in the will as well. Firstly, this court can fairly
assume that among the decedent's intentions was an attempt
to reduce Federal estate taxes to the smallest amount possible.
However, secondly, the will reflects an intent to benefit
the surviving spouse as well as a further intention to afford
beneficial interests to the decedent's children, including
those from a prior marriage. If this court were to construe
paragraph I of article third of this will so as to provide
an unlimited marital deduction, the effect thereof would be
to disinherit the decedent's children from any beneficial
interest in his estate. Paragraphs I and II of article third
of this will clearly create two trusts, a marital deduction
trust and family trust, each having separate fractional shares
of the residuary of this estate. The will and codicil thereto,
by their language, as well assumes that both trusts would
be funded. As such, the competing concerns present in the
instant proceeding dictate to this court that the proper [***8]
construction of the marital deduction trust herein should
not be of an unlimited character under ERTA.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and based on
the totality of the instant record, this court construes the
last will and testament of William O. Hickok, VI, deceased,
to the effect that the testator did not intend to disinherit
his children and that the marital deduction trust created
in paragraph I of article third should be funded by one half
of the adjusted gross estate of the decedent, reduced by the
value of the properties that passed to the decedent's spouse
as of the date of the death of this decedent. |